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ABSTRACT
Edward Snowden became a household name on June 5,
2013, when he leaked highly classified documents revealing
that the American Government was spying on its citizens.
The information exposed that the National Security Agency
(NSA) collected millions of American’s metadata through
forced cooperation with telephone-service providers.
Metadata contains sensitive and private information about
a person’s life. When collected and searched, metadata can
reveal a portrait of a person’s intimate activities amounting
to a violation of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
This Article suggests changing the current standard
allowing the NSA to collect and search metadata under
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The threshold
needed to obtain and search a person’s metadata should be
raised from the current standard of reasonable and
articulable suspicion to a higher burden of probable cause.
Since Mr. Snowden’s unauthorized disclosure, there has
been public outcry regarding metadata collection. In
response, President Obama issued a Public Policy
Directive limiting the scope of metadata that the NSA can
collect. Additionally, Congress has proposed legislation
changing how the NSA collects, stores, and searches
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metadata. The bills, however, keep intact the minimum
reasonable and articulable standard necessary to search
metadata.
The breadth of information that can be gleaned from
metadata makes it intrusive and subjects it to the Fourth
Amendment. Yet gathering and searching metadata can be
a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism and protecting
American citizens from future attacks. Requiring the
threshold to be raised to a probable cause determination
adequately balances privacy interests against national
security interests.
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INTRODUCTION
“Metadata is what allows an actual enumerated
understanding, a precise record of all the private
activities in all of our lives. It shows our
associations, our political affiliations and our actual
activities.” 1
1

Edward Snowden, Remarks at the Amnesty International USA Annual
General Meeting (Apr. 5, 2014); see Karl Plume, Snowden, Greenwald urge
caution of wider government monitoring at Amnesty event, REUTERS (Apr. 5,
2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/06/us-usa-security-
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On June 5, 2013, Edward Snowden shocked the world when he
revealed highly classified National Security Agency (NSA)
documents to The Guardian, a British daily newspaper. 2 These
documents exposed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s
(FISC) secret order instructing Verizon to collect metadata from all
telephone calls within the United States and abroad. 3 Snowden
disclosed that the NSA was spying on American citizens through
the mass collection of “telephony metadata,” with Congressional
and Presidential authorization. 4 Immediately thereafter, President
Obama and Senator Diane Feinstein began downplaying the
Orwellian nature of the program, notably justifying it by stating:
“it’s just metadata.” 5
However, the mass collection of metadata was troubling to
many Americans because the NSA was not only spying on those
believed to be associated with Al-Qaida but also on messages
between Americans without ties to suspected terrorism. 6 Even
snowden-idUSBREA3500320140406.
2
Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon
customers daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order.
3
Marjorie Cohn, NSA Metadata Collection: Fourth Amendment Violation,
JURIST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://jurist.org/forum/2014/01/marjorie-cohn-nsametadata.php; Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony
Metadata Under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act 1–2 (Aug. 9, 2013),
available at http://op.bna.com/der.nsf/id/sbay-9aeu73/.
4
In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible
Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 13–80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147002
(FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Primary Order]; Greenwald, supra note 2.
5
President Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals
Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence
[hereinafter President Obama’s Remarks]; Transcript: Diane Feinstein, Saxby
Chambliss, Explain, Defend NSA Phone Records Program, WASH. POST (June
6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/
transcript-dianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend-nsa-phone-recordsprogram [hereinafter Senator Feinstein’s Remarks]; see, e.g., ALDOUS HUXLEY,
BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932); GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1945); GEORGE
ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). These books popularized the concept
that would come to be known as “Orwellian”, which describes manipulation of
citizens by a totalitarian government by use of secret surveillance.
6
Id.; James Ball, NSA Monitored calls of 35 world leaders after US official
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more disturbing was the massive amount of sensitive and personal
information that could be gathered from metadata in and of itself. 7
As metadata became defined in the public sphere, it became clear
to Americans and human rights organizations alike that it’s not just
metadata.
The NSA’s sweeping surveillance was legalized when
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, arguably the most
expansive piece of legislation in America’s history. 8 Post-9/11, the
USA PATRIOT Act allowed the government to use surveillance
and technology more aggressively than ever before in an attempt to
prevent future attacks. 9
Congress originally authorized metadata collection under
Section 215 of the Act. 10 Section 215 was amended in the USA
PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which
required the government to provide “a statement of facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
objects sought are relevant . . . against international terrorism . . .
.” 11 Section 215 expanded the government’s ability to compel the
handed
over
contacts,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
24,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaderscalls; see Josh Levs & Catherine E. Shoichet, Europe furious, ‘shocked’ by
report of U.S. spying, CNN.COM, (July 1, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/
30/world/europe/eu-nsa (explaining that European officials are shocked and
outraged by the reports Snowden leaked that the NSA is spying on European
Union leaders).
7
See infra Part IV.
8
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT
Act), 107 Pub. L. No. 56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified in
scattered titles of U.S.C.); Drew Fennell, The USA PATRIOT Act: Can we be
Both Safe and Free?, 21 DEL. LAW. 10, 10 (2003) (“On October 25, 2001, a
matter of weeks after September 11, the U.S. Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act, a bill that contains the most sweeping and comprehensive
changes in domestic law enforcement in history . . . .”).
9
Richard A. Clarke et al., THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY
IN A CHANGING WORLD 73 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S REVIEW
GROUP REPORT].
10
USA PATRIOT Act § 215.
11
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120 Stat.
196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).
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production of “any tangible things including books, records,
papers, documents, and other items.” 12
Under this expanded program, the government began collecting
United States citizens’ call records without warrants. This program
is unprecedented because it targeted not only phone calls made to
suspects living outside of the country but call records between
American citizens themselves. The government systematically
collected and searched sensitive information on its own citizens
without meeting the constitutional constraints of the Fourth
Amendment. In most cases, the Fourth Amendment imposes a
warrant requirement to perform a search. 13 Prior to performing a
search on a constitutionally protected area, a person must first have
probable cause and then obtain a warrant from a judge. 14 The
government’s failure to obtain a warrant before searching a
person’s metadata records violates that person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy. 15 Even though government officials,
including President Obama, have reassured American citizens that
they are not listening to the content of their calls, the metadata of
these calls can still reveal an illuminating look at the callers’
private lives.
For example, consider Person X, an American citizen born in
the United States. Person X is a college-educated, 26-year-old
program developer who just began law school. He has no
association to terrorist activity. Yet every day the NSA collects his
phone records and stores all of his metadata in a database waiting
to be queried.
Imagine one day the NSA suspects that Person X is associated
with a terrorist organization. Every phone number he has contacted
within the past five years is collected. The information the
government could collect about Person X based solely on his
metadata displays detailed information about his life: the abortion
clinic he called in college after an accident with his girlfriend, his
pastor and religious affiliation, his therapist, his association with
the National Rifle Association, the presence of bill collectors, a
12

PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 81.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
14
Id.
15
Id.
13
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clinic that treats sexually transmitted diseases, or the pizza
restaurant down the street from his house from which he orders.
Suddenly, what seems like an innocent and harmless amount of
“metadata,” coupled with simple investigation, becomes an
intimate look into the personal life of Person X. The government
has no right to this level of private information about a person,
absent a warrant as required by the Fourth Amendment. Yet the
government collects this data on U.S. citizens on a daily basis.
Part I of this Article provides an in-depth background of the
development of the right to privacy with respect to modern
technology and surveillance. Part II discusses the history that led to
the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, particularly Section 215,
which authorizes metadata collection. Part III discusses current
challenges to the metadata collection program. Part IV argues that
the threshold to search metadata under Section 215 should be
raised from a reasonable articulable suspicion of terrorist activity
to the higher standard of probable cause.
I. THE HISTORY OF MODERN SURVEILLANCE DEVELOPED UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Modern surveillance can be traced to the Cold War era;
specifically, to the Vietnam War. 16 Former Presidents Lyndon
Johnson and Richard Nixon encouraged expansive surveillance of
individuals and organizations opposed to the war. 17 As a result, the
CIA began monitoring antiwar activists. 18 In the 1950s, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover conducted a massive counter-intelligence
program, known as COINTELPRO. 19 Under the guise of fighting
communism, the government engaged in surveillance, infiltration,
dissemination of false information, and abuse of the criminal
justice system. 20 In the 1970s, a series of congressional committees
16

PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 54.
Id. at 54–55.
18
Id.
19
Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty? Whose Security? The USA PATRIOT
Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of Political
Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051, 1080–88 (2002).
20
Id.
17
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convened to discuss what led to the abuses that had taken place
under COINTELPRO during the previous decades. 21
The final report, containing 96 policy recommendations, was
prepared by the Church Committee, named after Chairman Senator
Frank Church. 22 The Church Committee Report concluded that
spying endangers both the security of the nation and the rights of
Americans. 23 In 1976, President Gerald Ford formally prohibited
the CIA from using surveillance measures on American citizens
unless explicitly approved by the Attorney General. 24 The use of
electronic surveillance for national security purposes became a
growing concern, culminating in a series of privacy cases. 25 These
cases governed the way courts have viewed electronic data for
more than 40 years. 26
A. The Court’s Development of a Right to Privacy in
Emerging Technology
Three Supreme Court cases have helped shape the right to
privacy in light of emerging technological advancements. 27 The
invention of electronic devices led to the discovery of how to
eavesdrop on communications that use these devices. The police
turned to wiretapping to monitor otherwise private conversations in
21

Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Cong.
(1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Report].
22
Nicholas C. Dranias, The Patriot Act of 2001 versus the 1976 Church
Committee Report: An Unavoidable Clash of Fundamental Policy Judgments,
17 C.B.A. REC. 28, 29 (2003).
23
Id. at 30.
24
Exec. Order No. 11905, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, 41
Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 18, 1976).
25
See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miller v. United
States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
26
See, e.g., Olmstead, 227 U.S. at 478; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Miller, 425 U.S.
435; Smith, 442 U.S. 735; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (cases cited range from 1928 to
2012).
27
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
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order to collect evidence against suspected criminals. Those people
whose conversations were overheard challenged the collection of
such data, and the debate over privacy rights through electronic
communications began. Olmstead v. United States, Katz v. United
States, and United States v. Jones all involve electronic
surveillance and the right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment. 28
1. Olmstead v. United States: Establishing Privacy as a
Trespassory Doctrine
In Olmstead, federal agents installed wiretaps on phone lines to
investigate a conspiracy to distribute alcohol during the
Prohibition. 29 The agents tapped phone lines leading into the
suspects’ houses and offices without actually entering the
premises. 30 They gathered evidence for five months and recorded
multiple conversations. 31 The Supreme Court held that a wiretap
was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because there was not a physical trespass onto real property. 32 This
holding paved the way for the trespassory/non-trespassory
distinction regarding invasions into constitutionally protected
areas. 33 However, as people increasingly relied on the telephone
for conducting their private affairs, Olmstead’s reasoning became
more difficult to maintain. 34
Indeed, Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead has
become the flagship of privacy rights arguments in post-Olmstead
cases. 35 Justice Brandeis disagreed with the majority’s distinction
28
29

Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438; Katz, 389 U.S. 347; Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455–58 (describing the factual background of the

case).
30

Id.
Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32
Id. at 466.
33
Lon A. Berk, After Jones, The Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s
Treatment of Information, Big Data and the Cloud, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 12
(2014).
34
Id. at 13.
35
Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1296 (2010).
31

60 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:1

between trespassory and non-trespassory invasions. 36 He stated
that unjustified searches and seizures violate the Fourth
Amendment no matter how the information was gathered. 37 The
principles set forth in the majority, Brandeis reasoned, go to the
very nature of “constitutional liberty and security” and apply to all
invasions by the government. 38 What violates a person’s personal
liberty is not the actual rummaging of drawers, but the “invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security,” Brandeis wrote. 39 In
comparing wiretapping to mail tampering, Brandeis thought that
the invasion of the telephone was far worse. 40 When a telephone
line is tapped, confidential conversations are heard and privacy is
violated at both ends of the line. 41
2. Katz v. United States: Overruling Olmstead and Paving the
Way toward Non-Trespassory Privacy Rights
In 1967 the Supreme Court finally adopted a different test for
determining whether a search was reasonable, relying principally
on the Brandeis dissent in Olmstead. 42 In Katz v. United States,
Katz was a bookmaker who used a telephone booth to transmit
wagering information across state lines. 43 Federal agents used an
electronic listening device outside of the telephone booth and
obtained recordings of the calls. 44 The recordings were used at trial
to convict Katz. 45 On appeal, the government based its argument
on the trespassory view of the Fourth Amendment, noting that the
agents were outside of the phone booth and not within a
36

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477–78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. (“Unjustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment,
whatever the character of the paper; whether the paper when taken by the federal
officers was in the home, in an office, or elsewhere; whether the taking was
effected by force, by fraud, or in the orderly process of a court's procedure.”).
38
Id. at 474 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616).
39
Id. at 475 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616).
40
Id. at 475.
41
Id.
42
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
43
Id. at 348.
44
Id. at 348–54.
45
Id. at 348.
37
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constitutionally protected area. 46
The Supreme Court rejected this argument and overruled the
literal interpretation of Olmstead, recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment “protects people not places.” 47 Specifically, the Court
stated that telephone technology had become “vital” to private
communications and rejected the argument that the use of a
telephone was analogous to a broadcast of one’s voice into public
areas. 48 The Justices reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not simply areas, and a violation of the Fourth Amendment
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion. 49
Justice John Harlan’s concurrence built upon the framework set
forth in the majority opinion. 50 He formulated the “reasonable
expectation” test for determining whether government activity
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 51 The two-prong
test requires that (1) the individual has an actual (subjective)
expectation to privacy, and (2) the expectation is one society is
prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” 52 If both prongs are
satisfied, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 53 Harlan’s
test, and not the majority opinion, was adopted in Smith v.
Maryland and is the test now used to determine whether a search
has taken place. 54
3. United States v. Jones: Foreshadowing Modern NonTrespassory Privacy Concerns
In 2010 the Supreme Court unanimously held that tracking a
person’s movements for a month via a GPS monitoring device that
police had attached to the driver’s vehicle without a warrant

46

Id. at 352.
Id. at 351.
48
Id. at 352.
49
Id. at 353.
50
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
51
Id. at 360–61.
52
Id. at 361.
53
Id.
54
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
47
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violates the Fourth Amendment. 55 In United States v. Jones,
federal agents were investigating Mr. Jones for narcotics
distribution and placed a GPS device under his Jeep without a
warrant. 56 For the next 28 days, agents used the device to track the
Jeep and collected more than 2,000 pages of data. 57
Jones was convicted after the trial court found that his Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated since there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in movements from one place to another. 58
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that a “reasonable person
does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every
time he drives his car . . . rather, he expects his movements to
remain ‘disconnected and anonymous.’” 59 The Supreme Court’s
opinion was not based on the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test, but instead relied on the Olmstead analysis regarding
common law trespass. 60
B. Smith v. Maryland: Developing the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine further confuses a person’s privacy
rights when electronic devices are involved. In Smith v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court held that one who gives information to a thirdparty does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus
falls outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment. 61
In Smith, the defendant Smith was convicted of robbery after
the police instructed the telephone company to monitor the phone
numbers Smith dialed. 62 After the victim was robbed, she gave
55

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
Id. at 948.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (“[P]olice-citizen
communications which take place under circumstances in which the citizen's
‘freedom to walk away’ is not limited by anything other than his desire to
cooperate do not amount to ‘seizures' of the person.”), cert. denied 131 S. Ct.
671 (2010), aff’d, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
60
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
61
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
62
Id. at 737.
56
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police a description of the attacker and of an automobile parked
near the scene. 63 She also began receiving threatening phone calls
from the same attacker. 64 Eleven days later, a police officer spotted
a man matching the description provided by the victim driving the
same automobile. 65 The police officer traced the license plate to
Michael Smith. 66 The next day the telephone company, at the
request of the police department, installed a pen register at its main
office to record the numbers dialed from Smith’s telephone. 67 The
police did not have a warrant before the company installed the pen
register. 68 The register revealed Smith had called the victim after
the robbery, permitting police to obtain a warrant to search his
home. 69 Smith was arrested based on evidence gathered in his
home and afterwards he was positively identified by the victim as
her attacker. 70
During pre-trial motions, Smith sought to suppress all evidence
derived from the pen register, claiming the pen register violated his
Fourth Amendment right to privacy because the police failed to
obtain a warrant. 71 The trial court denied the motion and after
Smith was convicted, he appealed. 72 The court of appeals affirmed
the conviction, holding that "there is no constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into a
telephone system and hence no search within the fourth
amendment [sic] is implicated by the use of a pen register installed
at the central offices of the telephone company.” 73 Three judges
dissented, one stating that individuals do have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial and
concluding that the pen register was a search. 74
63

Id.
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 737–38.
73
Id. at 738 (quoting Smith v. State of Maryland, 283 Md. 156, 173 (1978)).
74
Id. at 738.
64
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The Supreme Court first quoted Katz v. United States in
defining what constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. 75 The Court noted the difference between Katz and
the pen register used against Smith. 76 In Katz the police used a
device to listen to the content of the defendant’s conversation. 77 In
Smith, the police only obtained a telephone number. 78 The
Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed from a phone because the user
voluntarily dials the numbers and conveys the information to the
telephone company. 79 The justification for this holding was
twofold. First, the Court doubted that “people in general entertain
any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.” 80
Second, the Court wrote that even if Smith did have an expectation
of privacy in the numbers he dialed, it was not one that society was
willing to recognize as reasonable. 81 This was based on the Court’s
previous holdings that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information disclosed to a third party. 82
Three of the Justices dissented, believing that Smith had a right
to privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that the pen register
did constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 83 Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote, “Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts
to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need
not assume that this information will be released to other persons
for other purposes.” 84 There was no way for the Supreme Court to
know its ruling would become the justification for the metadata
75

Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 740.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 745.
80
Id. at 742.
81
Id. at 743–44.
82
Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–444; Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335–36; United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
752 (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)).
83
Smith, 442 U.S. at 746–52 (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
84
Id. at 740.
76
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collection program. Yet the three dissenting Justices foreshadowed
the exact issue that is currently the subject of public debate:
whether society is ready to recognize a right to privacy in metadata
collected under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
II. ENACTMENT OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
Two pieces of legislation led to the metadata program under
Section 215. The first is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1979, and the second is the USA PATRIOT Act, which has been
amended several times since its inception in 2001. 85 The last
amendment expanded Section 215, which allowed the collection of
metadata as revealed by the Snowden disclosures in 2013. 86
A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Wiretapping
and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
In order to implement the recommendations of the Church
Committee Report, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978. 87 One of FISA’s goals was to
reconcile the Church Committee’s concerns for protecting people
against the abuse of power documented in the 1970’s with the
preservation of the government’s ability to protect itself from
foreign threat. 88 Although Katz held that the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the government from wiretapping without a warrant if
the interception would produce evidence of criminal conduct, it
remained unclear whether the same was true when the government
investigated “activities of foreign power.” 89
FISA was designed to address these questions, and its creation
involved strict rules and structured oversight by all three branches
85

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801
et seq. (1978); USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, § 215, 115
Stat. 272, 287–88 (2001) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
86
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 120
Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).
87
FISA § 1801.
88
Id. at 64.
89
United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972).
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of government. 90 FISA also created the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”) to provide judicial oversight of the
government’s authority and to handle the classified information
encompassed by foreign intelligence. 91 Under the original FISA,
any governmental agency seeking to use electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes must obtain a warrant by showing
probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. 92
Between its enactment in 1978 and September 11, 2001, FISA only
slightly widened its scope to include methods of investigation
beyond electronic surveillance. 93
B. September 11, 2001, and the USA PATRIOT Act
The events that took place on September 11, 2001, caused the
greatest number of casualties from a terrorist act on United States
soil. 94 In response to the 9/11 attacks, Former President George W.
Bush declared a “war on terrorism.” 95 On October 4, 2001, the
Senate proposed legislation designed to enhance law
enforcement’s ability to investigate potential and actual acts of
terrorism. 96 The Senate passed the bill with a vote of 96-to-1 after
ten days. 97 The House of Representatives proposed and approved
its own version of an anti-terrorism bill the following day by a vote
of 337 to 79. 98 These measures led to the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, passed by Congress on October 25, 2001, and signed into
law by President Bush the next day. 99 The USA PATRIOT Act
90

PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 65.
Id. at 66.
92
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–11.
93
PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 68.
94
Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot Act of
2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933, 959 (2002) [hereinafter Hijacking Civil
Liberties].
95
George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation
(Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html.
96
Evans, supra note 94, at 966.
97
Id. at 966.
98
Id. at 967.
99
Id.
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was designed to strengthen domestic security and broaden the
powers of law enforcement agencies to identify and stop
terrorism. 100 Split into ten parts, Title II: Enhanced Surveillance
Procedures authorizes metadata collection under Section 215. 101
C. The Metadata Collection Program is Created under
Section 215 in Two FISC Orders
When FISA was originally enacted in 1978, the government
did not have authority to compel documents. 102 Congress amended
FISA in 1998 after the Oklahoma bombings to allow FISC to
compel a narrow set of documents. 103 The USA PATRIOT Act
significantly expanded FISC’s authority to compel documents, but
was narrowed in the USA PATRIOT Act Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005. 104 As codified, Section 215
authorizes FISC to issue an order for the “production of any
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and
other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence
information not concerning a United States person or to protect
against international terrorism.” 105 Through two FISC orders,
however, the systematic metadata collection program was created.
First, FISC authorized mass collection of metadata in the “Primary
Order.” 106 Second, Verizon was ordered to submit metadata to
FISC and the NSA on an ongoing basis through the “Secondary
Order.” 107

100

Id. at 965.
USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001, 107 PUB. L. NO. 56, § 215, 115 STAT. 272,
287–88 (2001) (CODIFIED IN SCATTERED TITLES OF U.S.C.).
102
PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9, at 80.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 81; USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005, 120 Stat. 196 § 106 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)).
105
USA PATRIOT ACT § 215.
106
Primary Order, supra note 4.
107
In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things From Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc. ex. rel. MCI Commc'n
Servs. Inc. d/b/a Verizon Bus. Servs., No. BR 13–80, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147002, (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Secondary Order].
101
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1. The Primary Order to Collect Metadata
The NSA, under Section 215, issued a Primary Order in 2006
that set out the framework and requirements for the mass collection
of metadata. 108 The Primary Order required a high-ranking NSA
official to determine if there is a reasonable articulable suspicion
that the number being queried is associated with an international
terrorist organization. 109 Currently, there are 22 designated agents
who can authorize a query. 110 These agents may access the
information without approval from a FISC court order. 111 The
Government must seek authorization for Section 215 periodically
from FISC, which it does typically every 90 days. 112
Since 2006, different FISC judges have authorized the use of
Section 215 35 times. 113 However, during the authorization
process, FISC found on one occasion that the Government failed to
comply with the minimization procedures. 114 In January 2009, the
government reported that it used an “alert list” to search metadata
that was not approved under the requisite reasonable articulable
suspicion standard. 115 The FISC judge concluded that the
government engaged in systematic noncompliance and ordered the
NSA to seek FISC approval before conducting any inquiry for a
probationary six-month period. 116
Once an agent authorizes a query of a suspect, the agent enters
the phone number with which the suspect is associated. 117 The
phone number is the original identifier and is called a “seed.” 118
108

Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 5–7.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 9.
112
Id.
113
In Re Production of Tangible Things from [Undisclosed Service
Provider], Docket Number BR 08–13 (Mar. 2, 2009) (authorizing Section 215
35 times from 2006 through October 2013).
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (stating the probationary
period lasted only six months).
117
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
118
Id.
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When a seed is queried, it is referred to as a “hop.” 119 When the
phone number is initially queried during the first hop, the NSA
captures all metadata directly associated with that seed. 120 The
NSA can then make a second hop, in which the NSA captures all
metadata associated with each number identified from the first
hop. 121 The NSA had authorization, until February 5, 2014, to
make one additional hop, for a total of three hops. 122 Once the
NSA has collected metadata from the three hops, it can conduct an
unlimited number of searches with the breadth of data collected
without oversight from FISC and without making additional
reasonable articulable suspicion determinations. 123
2. The Secondary Order Directing Verizon to Submit Metadata
The Secondary Order directed Verizon to provide to the NSA
all metadata “on an ongoing daily basis.” 124 It directed Verizon to
produce “all call detail records” or “telephony metadata” created
both between the United States and abroad, and “wholly within the
United States, including local telephone calls.” 125 The metadata
included session-identifying information, trunk identifier,
telephone calling card numbers, and call durations. 126 The last part
of the order prohibited Verizon from disclosing any information
given to the NSA or FBI. 127 Because of the gag order, Verizon and
other phone companies could not discuss or reveal that their
customers’ metadata was being systematically transmitted to the
NSA until the Snowden disclosures leaked the information. 128

119
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121
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124
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ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 734 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17.
Secondary Order, supra note 107.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2–3.
Id.
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III. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE METADATA COLLECTION
PROGRAM AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 215 OF THE
USA PATRIOT ACT
Since Snowden revealed classified documents uncovering the
metadata collection program, there have been several challenges
regarding the constitutionality of Section 215. First, two U.S.
District Courts have issued conflicting holdings regarding Section
215. 129 Second, the Presidential Review Group’s massive review
on the USA PATRIOT Act found Section 215 to be
unconstitutional. 130 Third, none of President Obama’s proposed
changes to Section 215 have been passed into law. 131 Fourth,
Congress proposed several pieces of legislation reforming Section
215 that are currently sitting in House Committees. 132
A. Klayman v. Obama: Section 215 is
Likely to be Unconstitutional
In Klayman v. Obama, the court found the NSA program
“almost certainly” violates the Fourth Amendment. 133 The court
distinguished the current NSA program from the pen register in
Smith, claiming an “Orwellian” intelligence gathering system
between telecommunication companies and the Government. 134
The court in Klayman found that the problem with this system is
that people have entirely different relationships with phones today
129

ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757; Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 43.
130
PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9.
131
The White House, FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Proposal for
Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/27/factsheet-administration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m
[hereinafter Obama’s Proposal for Ending Section 215].
132
LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); USA
FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Telephone Metadata
Reform Act, H.R. 3875, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014).
133
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (“I believe that bulk telephony metadata
collection and analysis almost certainly does violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”).
134
Id. at 33; see supra note 5 (defining “Orwellian”).
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than they did when the third-party doctrine was created in Smith. 135
Call records, which then would have given the police only
scattered information about one’s life, now “reveal an entire
mosaic—a vibrant and constantly updating picture of the person’s
life.” 136 The court further reasoned that modern society is better
prepared and more willing to accept a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a phone’s metadata, making the metadata program
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 137
B. ACLU v. Clapper: Section 215 is Constitutional under the
Third-Party Doctrine
In ACLU v. Clapper, the ACLU and other non-profit
organizations filed a lawsuit less than a week after the disclosure
of the Secondary Order. 138 The NSA collected metadata of the
ACLU, a Verizon customer, as required by the Secondary
Order. 139 The ACLU’s phone records could be used to identify
confidential clients such as journalists, legislators, and members of
the public. 140 This, they argued, violated their First and Fourth
Amendment rights. 141
The court followed a strict reading of Smith. 142 It held that,
because Verizon users—ACLU included—voluntarily transmitted
numbers they dialed, there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in those numbers. 143 The court stated that the sheer volume
of information the NSA can collect and store does not make it a
Fourth Amendment violation. 144 Ultimately, the court dismissed
the case for lack of standing. 145 The ACLU filed an appeal on

135
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137
138
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140
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Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
Id.
Id.
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751–52.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id. at 754.
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March 6, 2014. 146 The Government’s reply brief was filed on April
10, 2014. 147 The ACLU filed an additional reply brief on April 24,
2014, and the case is pending hearing as of the writing of this
Article. 148
C. The President’s Review Group Report Recommends
Terminating Metadata Collection due to
Privacy Concerns
In response to the general concerns of the American public
after the Snowden disclosures, President Obama created the
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies
(“President’s Review Group”). 149 The President’s Review Group
published a document (“The Report”) consisting of 46 policy
recommendations to the President that cover a variety of NSA
programs, including Section 215 of The USA PATRIOT Act. 150
The recommendations consider both the public’s civil liberties and
the necessity of homeland security. 151 With respect to Section 215,
The Report recommends the NSA end bulk storage of metadata. 152
It suggests a third-party hold the data instead. 153 The President’s
Review Group cites privacy concerns, similar to those discussed in
this Article, as its justification for terminating the metadata
program as currently administered by the NSA. 154
146

Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y.
Dec.
27,
2013)
(No.
14-42),
https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/assets/corrected_brief_of_plaintiffs-appellants_-_final_
stamped_03_07_2014.pdf.
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Brief for Defendants-Appellees, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724
(S.D.N.Y. Dec 27, 2013) (No. 14-42), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/assets/2014-04-10_clapper_govt-opposition-brief.pdf.
148
Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d
724 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2013) (No. 14-42) https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/
files/assets/aclu_v._clapper_ca2_reply_brief_final_stamped.pdf.
149
PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 9.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1.
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Id. at 17.
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Id. at 86–88 (citing In Re Production of Tangible Things from
Undisclosed Service Provider, Docket Number BR: 08-13 (Mar. 2, 2009)).
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D. President Obama’s Proposed Changes and Pending
Congressional Legislation
In a speech regarding the NSA’s programs, President Obama
told the American people that the metadata collection program
would continue, although not as broadly. 155 However, through a
Presidential Directive, President Obama eliminated the third
hop. 156 Further, President Obama instructed the Attorney General
to develop a new method to match the capabilities of Section 215
without the NSA actually holding the metadata. 157
While several bills have been proposed to reform Section 215
in the House of Representatives, the USA FREEDOM Act has the
most support with 142 co-sponsors. 158 The USA FREEDOM Act
was introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29,
2013. 159 USA FREEDOM stands for “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnetcollection, and Online Monitoring” Act. 160 This Act would amend
the PATRIOT Act similarly to the LIBERT-E Act. 161 Both bills
propose the FBI must include a statement of facts indicating that
there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things
sought are relevant and material to an authorized investigation” in
order to request metadata records from a phone provider. 162
On January 9, 2014, this bill was also referred to the
subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
155

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of
Signals
Intelligence
(Jan.
17,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-presidentreview-signals-intelligence) [hereinafter President Obama’s Remarks].
156
Id.
157
Obama’s Proposal for Ending Section 215, supra note 131.
158
USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013);
Congress, Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV (Oct.
29, 2013), http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361; see also
LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Telephone Metadata
Reform Act, H.R. 3875, 113th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2014).
159
Summary: H.R. 3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 158.
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Id. at § 101(a)(1)(B).
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Id.
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Investigations. 163 On May 22, 2014, this bill passed the House of
Representatives as amended. 164
IV. THE STANDARD TO SEARCH METADATA SHOULD BE
RAISED TO A PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
BECAUSE OF VAST PRIVACY CONCERNS
Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up
essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve
neither Liberty nor Safety.” 165 However, in the modern world,
government surveillance of people at home and abroad is
necessary to protect against threats that Mr. Franklin could never
have imagined. 166 When does the government cross the line
between safety and liberty? The Snowden leaks startled many
Americans because of the seeming impossibility that a democratic
state could become a surveillance state. 167 Civil liberties groups
have called for the elimination of metadata collection—citing
egregious civil rights violations—by bringing lawsuits against the
NSA and President Obama. 168
163
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visited July 31, 2014).
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In re FBI, No. 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991, at *30–31 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
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communications routing information, such as including originating and
terminating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI)
number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, trunk
identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call).
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See supra note 5 (defining “Orwellian”).
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E.g., ACLU, Time to Rein in the Surveillance State, ACLU.ORG,
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Following public backlash regarding metadata collection, all
three branches of the Government are taking action. After
President Obama spoke to the American people specifically about
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 169 he issued a Presidential
Policy Directive reigning in aspects of the metadata collection
program. Additionally, there are roughly 30 different legislative
bills before Congress altering the metadata collection program. 170
Two circuit courts have ruled on the opposite sides of the
constitutionality of Section 215. 171 Political activist Larry Klayman
appealed his case, Klayman v. Obama, directly to the Supreme
Court on February 3, 2014, citing its “imperative public
importance.” 172 However, the Supreme Court denied his petition,
leaving the constitutionality of Section 215 unresolved. 173 While
the exact fate of the metadata collection program remains
unknown, the Government’s proposed actions merely provide a
façade of change.
President Obama’s Policy Directive and Congress’ attempt at
legislation with the USA FREEDOM Act are both superficial
attempts at rectifying privacy concerns because the Government
does not concede to the necessity of a warrant to search metadata,
as required for searches under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the
current reasonable articulable suspicion standard is kept intact in
the proposed legislation from both the House of Representatives
and President Obama. 174 The Government, through FISC court
documents, continually relies on the third-party doctrine in

169

President Obama’s Remarks, supra note 155.
David Kravets, Supreme Court passes on NSA bulk phone surveillance
case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 7, 2014, 6:46 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2014/04/supreme-court-passes-on-nsa-bulk-phone-surveillance-case/.
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Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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134 S. Ct. 1795 (Apr. 7, 2014).
173
Id.
174
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denying a reasonable expectation of privacy in metadata. 175
However, the third-party doctrine fails to take into account the vast
privacy concerns associated with modern technology.
Because so much information about a person’s private life can
be gleaned from the collection of metadata, the Government should
be required to obtain a warrant before searching metadata. As
required by the Fourth Amendment, the standard for a warrant is
probable cause. 176 Thus, the NSA should be required to make a
probable cause determination to perform a “hop” on an American
citizen’s metadata. This requirement will protect citizens’ privacy
rights regardless of whether the NSA or the phone companies hold
the metadata.
A. The Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Standard should be
Updated because It Fails to Take Into Account the
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy that should be
Associated with Metadata
Although The President’s Review Group found Section 215 to
be unconstitutional, the metadata program may be a useful tool in
the fight against terrorism, as President Obama has argued. 177 For
this reason, instead of suggesting an end to the metadata program,
the standard for searching metadata during a hop should be
changed to require a higher burden of proof showing that the seed
being queried is associated with terrorist activity. When FISA was
originally enacted, the Government had to show probable cause to
believe the target of the electronic surveillance was an agent of a
foreign power. 178 This required FISC to obtain a warrant from a
neutral and detached magistrate before accessing sensitive data. 179
However, in the wake of 9/11, the threshold was lowered to
require only “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe
175

See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL
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that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power.” 180 This standard was too open-ended
and Congress again changed the standard required to search
metadata under Section 215 to “a statement of facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible objects
sought are relevant.” 181 The standards used in both thresholds (the
lowered one of 2001, and the slightly higher one of 2005) rely on
the out-of-date third-party doctrine and privacy justifications.
Additionally, the Report points out the ease with which the
NSA has abused the metadata program. 182 It cited that “[a]lmost 90
percent of the numbers on the alert list did not meet the
‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ standard.” 183 The NSA should
be required to obtain a warrant from FISC before performing any
queries because metadata reveals detailed information about a
person.
1. Metadata Reveals Highly Personal and Sensitive Information
Subject to Fourth Amendment Protection
Since the Snowden revelations, those in charge of intelligence
have downplayed the significance of metadata. 184 President Obama
assured the American people the content of calls was not being
collected. 185 The Chairwoman of the Senate’s Committee on
Intelligence, Dianne Feinstein, remarked that “this is just

180

See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended at 50
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181
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/06/transcriptdianne-feinstein-saxby-chambliss-explain-defend-nsa-phone-records-program
[hereinafter Senator Feinstein’s Remarks]; President Obama’s Remarks, supra
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metadata.” 186 Although voice content can be hard to process and
difficult to collect on a mass scale, metadata is perfectly suited to
computer analysis. 187 Metadata can show the context of a person’s
life and give an intimate look into one’s interests, values, and
societal roles. 188 Metadata can also be a rich source for obtaining
sensitive information about one’s identity, location, and social
network. 189 When cross-checked against easily accessed public
records, metadata can reveal a person’s name, address, credit
history, and more. 190 Although the metadata collection program
offers powerful tools in the fight against terrorism, it severely
implicates personal expectations of privacy. 191
In an Amici Curiae Brief written in support of a reversal of
ACLU v. Clapper by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a small
but compelling example is given demonstrating the sensitivities
associated with the collection of metadata. If a single telephone
call to a bookie is made, it suggests that a person likely made a
bet. 192 But an analysis of metadata over time could reveal that the
same person has a gambling problem. 193 While aggregating
metadata is troubling for an individual, it is even more troubling
when connections are made between individuals and larger social
trends. 194 Analysis of metadata over time can “map the
associations of individuals, revealing friendships, business
186
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relationships, and social and political connections.” 195 While this
language focuses on the individual, collecting and searching
metadata affects the lives of millions of Americans.
Each time the NSA performs a hop, the number of people
Section 215 affects expands exponentially. For example, Person X
is a suspect, and he made 100 phone calls. The NSA would have
access to all 100 of those phone numbers Person X was in contact
with. The NSA then has authorization to make a second hop; that
is, to take the 100 phone numbers associated with Person X and
look at the metadata associated with each of those numbers. 196
Further, if the 100 people Person X contacted each also contacted
100 people, the pool of metadata would now include 10,000 total
phone numbers (100 people times 100 phone numbers).
A third hop would take the 10,000 phone numbers that were
pooled during the second hop, and look at every number that was
contacted. If each of those 10,000 people called 100 people, the
metadata pool would now consist of 100 phone numbers (first hop)
times 100 phone numbers (second hop) times 100 phone numbers
(third hop), totaling a pool of one million phone numbers to query.
Until President Obama’s speech on January 17, 2014, the NSA had
authorization to make the third hop. 197 FISC formally approved
removing the third hop on February 5, 2014, stating its deletion
adequately balances privacy and national security interests set forth
in President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive. 198
To illustrate this point with real people, an online blog,
Webpolicy.org, performed a short-term study to learn if sensitive
and personal inferences could be drawn from metadata. 199
195
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Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of
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28, 2014).
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Beginning in November 2013, WebPolicy.org had participants
install the “MetaPhone” application on their Android phones. 200
MetaPhone runs in the background of the user’s device and
submits device logs and social media information for analysis. 201
While this study is on a relatively small scale (546 participants),
WebPolicy.org found that “phone metadata is unambiguously
sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time
window.” 202 In total, the 546 participants contacted 33,688 unique
phone numbers. 203 18 percent of those numbers were identifiable
by matching phone numbers against public records, such as Yelp
and Google Places directories. 204 Participants had contacted
Alcoholics Anonymous, labor unions, divorce lawyers, strip clubs,
and sexually transmitted disease clinics. 205
Additionally, the study indicated a pattern of calls that revealed
more sensitive information than individual call records. 206 For
example, a participant made phone calls to local neurology groups,
a specialty pharmacy, a rare condition management service, and a
hotline for a drug used solely to treat multiple sclerosis. 207 An
inference can be made, based on this participant’s metadata alone,
that this participant has a serious medical condition.
WebPolicy.org was able to corroborate this participant’s medical
condition proving that metadata does reveal personal and sensitive
content. 208 Another participant had a long telephone call with her
sister, then two days later placed a series of calls to Planned
Parenthood. 209 She placed another series of calls two weeks later,
and a final call a month after. 210 As this study shows, the NSA can
gather and use power data with the tools it currently has at its
disposal.
200
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To collect and search a person’s metadata, the government
should have to show probable cause that the person whose records
are being searched is associated with international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities. 211 Gathering the metadata on
Person X and everyone whom each of those 100 people contacted
is an egregious violation of privacy. Because of the privacy
implications and the breadth of information that can be quickly
amassed, the NSA should not be allowed to collect metadata
without individualized suspicion that Person X is associated with
terrorism.
2. The Third-Party Doctrine should be Updated in Light of
Modern Technology
The third-party doctrine should be updated to reflect the
modern relationship between a person and his cell phone. In
United States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor foreshadowed concerns
over gathering information through surveillance, noting it could
lead to “a too permeating police surveillance.” 212 She suggested
that it might be “necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 213 Much like Justice
Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence is at the forefront of the privacy
argument in the new age. 214
The third-party doctrine, as established in Smith v. Maryland,
states that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily handed over to a third-party. 215 FISC relies
211

50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (using the same language as the statute that the
“tangible things sought are relevant . . . against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities”).
212
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayer, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213
Id. at 957.
214
ACLU Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 192, at 11 (using Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence to make the argument that aggregated metadata
generated a comprehensive record of people’s habits).
215
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (holding there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy when a person voluntarily gives their number to a third
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on the holding in Smith to defend the production of metadata by
telephone service providers to the NSA. 216 A person who gets a
cell phone voluntarily discloses metadata to his or her cell carrier,
a third-party, and his or her expectation of privacy is defeated.
However, the facts of Smith are vastly different from what the
NSA is doing under Section 215. 217 Today’s circumstances have
become so unlike those of the 1970s that the precedent set in Smith
becomes completely frustrated. These circumstances include the
Government’s surveillance capabilities, the modern day
relationship users have with their cell phones, and the relationship
between the phone companies and the NSA. 218
In Klayman, the Court found four main reasons that the thirdparty doctrine cannot justify the modern surveillance program
under Section 215. 219 First, the pen register installed on Smith’s
phone was to last a mere 13 days, and it collected data regarding
that case only. 220 Thus the information collected was short-term
and highly limited. 221 In contrast, the information that the NSA
collects is vast and on-going over the course of half a decade. 222
Second, in Smith, the police requested the phone company install
the pen register on its own equipment to record the numbers
dialed. 223 Under the current Secondary Order, telephone
companies are required to provide the NSA records “on a daily
basis.” 224 The Government forces the third-parties (the telephone
companies) to “create a formalized policy under which the service
provider collects information for law enforcement purposes,”
party).
216
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circumventing the Fourth Amendment. 225
Third, the Smith Court in the 1970s could not have conceived
of the collection of metadata on such an expansive scale. 226
Finally, the scale on which people use their phones is inherently
different than it was in the 1970s. 227 Not only is there a significant
increase in phone usage (71,958,000 homes with phones in 1979
versus 326,475,248 mobile subscribers in 2012), 228 but the
relationship between phone and user is also more personal than
ever before. 229 Because of modern and intimate use of phones,
information that is gleaned from metadata has changed not only in
quantity but also in quality. 230
Creating a trail of metadata is an unavoidable byproduct of
modern life and metadata should not be considered in a vacuum. 231
The ACLU Amici Curiae Brief argued that metadata is generated
through the “innumerable and near-continuous digital transactions
and interactions” presented by modern life. 232 Financial
transactions, medical records, travel records, communications,
legal proceedings, biological information, education, health care,
and entertainment are personal “digital tracks” every person leaves
by simply participating in modern life. 233 Acts such as applying for
a loan, renting a DVD, sending or receiving a package, files, or
receiving medications through the mail generate metadata. 234 It
would be practically impossible for an individual to avoid creating
metadata in today’s world. 235 A person can no longer assume the
risk that their information may be handed over to a third-party
because this transaction has now become a daily, if not hourly,
occurrence.
Information that was once scattered now reveals a mosaic of a
225
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228
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230
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234
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Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 18.

84 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 10:1

person’s life. 236 The modern changes in technology render the
third-party doctrine outdated and in need of a new jurisprudence
that considers an updated look at the expectation of privacy in
metadata information.
B. The Actions Proposed by the Government are Ineffective
because They Maintain the Lower “Reasonable and
Articulable Suspicion” Standard
The Government’s proposed legislation is ineffective because
it fails to raise the needed threshold to probable cause and
continues to diminish citizens’ privacy concerns. Representative
James Sensenbrenner, Jr., the original author of the USA
PATRIOT ACT and lead author on the proposed USA FREEDOM
Act, acknowledged that “the NSA was doing some things that were
far beyond what the intent of the law should have been . . . .” 237 He
criticized Senator Feinstein’s proposed legislation, specifically
noting that her bill “is a joke” and her view is essentially that “if
you like your NSA, you can keep it.” 238 What Congress and the
President fail to mention, however, is that the problem lies not only
with mass collection of metadata, but also in the way the
Government is able to access and search the metadata. This
troubling standard remains unchanged and leaves the door open to
a multitude of privacy violations.
President Obama’s Policy Directive is superficial because it
fails to provide any substantial changes that protect privacy rights.
In President Obama’s speech to the American people, he proudly
claimed to end Section 215 metadata collection “as it currently
exists.” 239 However, bulk collection is not the biggest problem.
The problem is not where the metadata is being stored, but how the
236
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metadata is accessed.
First, President Obama limited the NSA to searching metadata
within only two hops of the selection term being used instead of
three. 240 Second, the metadata would no longer be collected in bulk
by the NSA but would remain with the phone companies. 241 Third,
the NSA would obtain the records pursuant to individual orders
from FISC. 242 Although these recommendations appear to solve
the problem of “dragnet surveillance,” they fail to provide any real
safety from abuse by the NSA. 243
The problem with President Obama’s Presidential Policy
Directive is that it is not binding. 244 Presidential Directives can be
amended or withdrawn at any time by the current President. 245
Even if Americans trust President Obama to follow through on the
policy directives he proposed, the president in 2016 could reverse
those changes with the swipe of a pen. 246 Unless codified in a
statute by Congress, any future president, at any time and for any
reason, could re-instate the third hop and bring metadata collection
back under the purview of the NSA.
Additionally, none of the bills Congress has offered produce
any substantial change to Section 215. None of the thirty-plus bills
mention raising the standard from reasonable, articulable suspicion
to probable cause. Most of the bills proposed, including the
flagship USA FREEDOM Act, herald an ending to bulk metadata
collection. 247 However, the USA FREEDOM Act barely amends
240
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the current standard. Current law requires the government to
submit a statement of facts showing reasonable grounds to believe
that the tangible things or records sought are relevant to an
authorized investigation. 248
Yet Section 101 of the USA FREEDOM Act would require the
Government to show that the tangible things sought are relevant
and material to an authorized investigation and that they pertain to
(a) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, (b) the
activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the
subject of such an authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in
contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power
who is the subject of such authorized investigation. 249 This
proposed change only narrows what can be considered an
“authorized investigation.” The NSA would still be able to collect
and search metadata based on the lowered standard of reasonable
and articulable suspicion.
Unless the standard necessary to collect and search metadata is
raised to probable cause and requires the NSA to obtain a search
warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, the same concerns
that are currently present could be reinstated even if the proposed
actions are implemented. FISC could reinstate dragnet bulk
metadata collection under the NSA’s direction. FISC previously
concluded in 2009 that for two-and-a-half years the NSA had
“frequently and systematically violated” the minimization
procedures put in place to prevent abuse. 250 FISC Judge Walton
also found additional noncompliance issues involving trained
analysts querying the metadata without being aware that they were
doing so. 251 The FBI could once again issue National Security
Letters forcing Verizon and other telecommunication companies to
comply with ongoing metadata disclosure. Verizon would have no
way to disclose such an order to the public because every National
Security Letter contains a gag order forbidding the receiver from

248
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revealing the Letter’s existence. 252 The actions the Government,
including President Obama and Congress, are proposing are simply
not enough to protect American citizens’ privacy rights.
It is unlikely that searching metadata in the fight against
terrorism will ever cease. 253 By requiring the standard to be raised
to probable cause instead of reasonable and articulable suspicion,
Americans will know their privacy is protected under the Fourth
Amendment no matter what agency or company is holding their
metadata.
CONCLUSION
The metadata information the Government is able to collect,
store, and search on a massive scale makes Section 215 a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is clear: to
search a constitutionally protected area, one must have probable
cause and obtain a warrant from a detached and neutral judge. 254
That is not being done under the metadata program. 255 Although
the Government has proposed legislation to modify parts of
Section 215, it has failed to change the standard under which the
NSA can search metadata. Because enormous amounts of
information can be gleaned from metadata revealing the intimacies
of a person’s life, it is time to recognize a right to privacy in
metadata. By giving metadata Katz-level protection, metadata
should be protected under the Fourth Amendment. This would
require the NSA to seek a warrant from FISC showing probable
cause that the suspect is linked to terrorist activity. Requiring a
higher standard for the Government to perform any search of
metadata adequately balances the need for privacy in this
252
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enormous amount of sensitive information with the need to protect
Americans from future terrorist threats.

